

Message Text

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TO AMEMBASSY KINSHASA

S E C R E T STATE 077664

EXDIS

FOLLOWING REPEAT OTTAWA 1099 ACTION SECSTATE INFO
LUANDA 24 MARCH.

QUOTE

S E C R E T OTTAWA 1099

EXDIS

EO 11652 XGDS1

TAGS PFOR PO AO

SUBJ UNITA SEEKS U.S. SUPPORT

BEGIN XGDS1

SUMMARY: SAVIMBI EMISSARY DR. VIEIRA TRANSMITS REQUEST FOR U.S.
FINANCIAL SUPPORT FOR UNITA OF CLOSE TO \$2 MILLION, NEEDED URGENTLY
SINCE PREVIOUSLY PROMISED SUPPORT FROM PORTUGUESE BANKERS FORE-
CLOSED BY NATIONALIZATION OF PORTUGUESE BANKS. VIEIRA ARGUES UNITA
WORTHY OF SUPPORT ON GROUNDS IT HAS WELL OVER MAJORITY SUPPORT OF
ANGOLAN ELECTORATE (INCLUDING AT LEAST 75 PERCENT OF WHITES),
IS MODERATE SOCIALIST/PRAGMATIC IN OUTLOOK, AND IS ONLY ONE OF
THREE PARTIES WHICH WILL GUARANTEE CONTINUED WHITE PRESENCE AND
HAS CAPABILITY OF SAVING ANGOLA FROM EITHER COMMUNIST DOMINATION
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THROUGH SOVIET-AND AFM-BACKED MPLA OR ZAIRIAN IMPERIALISM
EXERCISED THROUGH FNLA. END SUMMARY.

1. IN LENGTHY CONVERSATIONS MARCH 21 AND 22 WITH POL COUNSELOR,

DR. JOAQUIM FERNANDES VIEIRA, EQUIPPED WITH LETTER FROM SAVIMBI GIVING HIM FULL AUTHORITY TO SPEAK ON BEHALF UNITA, DESCRIBED CURRENT POLITICAL SITUATION IN ANGOLA, CONCLUDING WITH PLEA FOR URGENT US FINANCIAL SUPPORT FOR UNITA. HIS REQUEST WAS FOR \$1 MILLION IN U.S. CURRENCY TO BE DELIVERED IN CASH IN LUANDA (HE SUGGESTED VIADIPLOMATIC POUCH TO CONGEN) WHICH, GIVEN VIRTUALLY 100 PERCENT EXCHANGE PREMIUM FOR US DOLLARS, UNITA COULD CONVERT INTO ANGOLAN ESCUDO EQUIVALENT OF \$2 MILLION. IN ADDITION, UNITA, OPERATING THROUGH LOCAL AIR TAXI FIRM AIR ANGOL, HAS DEPOSITED 15 PERCENT OF \$1,050,000 PURCHASE PRICE FOR BEECHCRAFT SUPER KING-AIR AIRCRAFT AND SEEKS U.S. SUPPORT FOR BALANCE OF \$892,500. AIR ANGOL HAS OPTION UNTIL APRIL 13 ON ONE SUCH AIRCRAFT CURRENTLY IN LONDON AND HAS SECURED IMPORT PERMIT. AIRCRAFT, WHICH HE DESCRIBED AS 6- TO 10-SEATER NON-JET WITH 330 MPH CRUISING SPEED WITH RANGE EQUIVALENT TO LUANDA-ABIDJAN, IS NEEDED TO ENABLE SAVIMBI TO CAMPAIGN THROUGHOUT ANGOLA AS WELL AS VISIT FRIENDLY AFRICAN NATIONS (HE NOTED THAT MPLA NETO CAN GO ANYWHERE ON PORTUGUESE MILITARY AIRCRAFT WHILE FNLA ROBERTO HAS AIR ZAIRE AIRCRAFT ALWAYS AVAILABLE). \$1 MILLION CONTRIBUTION NEEDED TO OUTFIT 8,000 TROOPS UNITA REQUIRED CONTRIBUTE TO ANGOLAN MILITARY FORCE (HE CLAIMED UNITA HAS TOTAL OF 40,000 RECRUITS AVAILABLE) AND ALSO TO ENABLE UNITA TO MAINTAIN POLITICAL CADRES, BUILD SCHOOLS AND CLINICS AND GENERALLY CONVINCE ANGOLAN ELECTORATE THAT THEY ARE VIABLE ALTERNATIVE TO MPLA AND FNLA.

2. VIEIRA SAID HE HAD GONE TO PARIS TO OBTAIN CONFIRMATION OF FINANCIAL SUPPORT FROM PORTUGUESE BANKERS WHO CONTROLLED BANKS IN ANGOLA. PRIOR TO MARCH 11, HE HAD RECEIVED ASSURANCES FROM CUPER-TINO DE MIRANDA (BANCO PORTUGUESE DO ATLANTICO, WHICH HAS 51 PERCENT OF BANCO COMERCIAL DE ANGOLA), ESPIRITO SANTOS (WHO CONTROL 50 PERCENT OF BANCO INTERUNIDO, OTHER 50 PERCENT HELD BY FIRST NATIONAL CITY BANK OF NEW YORK), AND FROM ANTONIO CHAMPALIMAUD (WHO HAS CONTROLLING INTEREST IN BANCO PINTO E SOTTO MAYOR). THE POST-MARCH 11 NATIONALIZATIONS OF THE PORTUGUESE PARENT BANKS HAS CLOSED THAT AVENUE OF SUPPORT AND RENDERED URGENT THE NEED TO ARRANGE REPLACEMENT FINANCING. ONLY POTENTIAL SOURCE VIEIRA COULD THINK OF WHICH WOULD NOT CARRY WITH IT UNACCEPTABLE
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POLITICAL COMPROMISE AND RISK WAS USG. END XGDS1

3. VIEIRA ASSERTED THAT MPLA HAS UNLIMITED FUNDS AND ARMS AVAILABLE FROM SOVIETS, AND FNLA THE SAME FROM ZAIRE. ADDITIONALLY, HE KNOWS FOR CERTAINTY THAT PORTUGUESE MILITARY HAVE ORDERS TO INTERVENE ON SIDE OF MPLA IF MPLA SHOULD BECOME INVOLVED IN CLASHES WITH EITHER UNITA OR FNLA. HE ADMITTED UNDER QUESTIONING THAT THERE CONSIDERABLE DOUBT THAT PORTUGUESE SOLDIERS WOULD OBEY ORDERS TO FIGHT EXCEPT IN SELF-DEFENSE, BUT HE INSISTED THAT THOSE ARE THE ORDERS ISSUED BY THE PORTUGUESE ARMED FORCES MOVEMENT (AFM) AND HE CONFIDENT THAT "COMMUNIZED" CAPTAINS AND MAJORS SENT TO ANGOLA SINCE LAST APRIL 25 WILL ATTEMPT TO CARRY THEM OUT, AS INDEED THEY HAVE DEMONSTRATED CLEAR BIAS FOR MPLA WHENEVER

POSSIBLE. THIS PRO-MPLA ATTITUDE ON PART AFM WILL UNDOUBTEDLY INTENSIFY NOW THAT THERE IS IN EFFECT IN PORTUGAL A "COMMUNIST-CONTROLLED GOVERNMENT."

4. THESE PESSIMISTIC VIEWS CONCERNING GOP WERE EXPRESSED BY VIEIRA MARCH 21 BUT WERE TEMPERED SOMEWHAT MARCH 22 BY BBC RADIO NEWS REPORT THAT MAJORS MELO ANTUNES AND VITOR ALVES HAD BEEN ADDED TO REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL AND THAT CDS HAD ANNOUNCED INTENTION TO PARTICIPATE IN ELECTIONS, ALL OF WHICH VIEIRA INTERPRETED AS HOPEFUL SIGNS. VIEIRA ALSO ADMITTED THAT HIGH COMMISSIONER BRIGADIER SILVA CARDOSO WAS DOING HIS BEST TO MAINTAIN NEUTRAL ATTITUDE HIMSELF AND HAVE PORTUGUESE MILITARY DO THE SAME. HOWEVER, VIEIRA SAID SILVA CARDOSO UNABLE COUNTERMAND DIRECTIVES FROM AFM IN PORTUGAL, AS WITNESS THE RECENT ARREST AND TRANSPORT TO CAXIAS PRISON IN PORTUGAL OF JOAO FERNANDES, EDITOR OF LUANDA WEEKLY MAGAZINE NOTICIAS, WHO HAD CRITICIZED COPCON. VIEIRA SAID THAT ARREST OF FERNANDES, WHO IS MEMBER FLNA, HAS ALSO CAUSED DISSENSION WITHIN FNLA RANKS BECAUSE ARREST REQUIRED DECISION BY PRESIDENTIAL COLLEGIUM WITH FNLA REP ON COLLEGIUM, JOHNNY EDUARDO, CASTING DECIDING VOTE IN FAVOR.

5. VIEIRA CLAIMED UNITA HAS ALLEGIANCE OF VIRTUALLY ALL OF SOUTHERN ANGOLA, SPECIFICALLY TOTAL SUPPORT OF OVIMBUNDO PEOPLE WHO CONSTITUTE WELL OVER HALF OF TOTAL ANGOLAN BLACK POPULATION. ONLY DOUBTFUL STARTERS IN SOUTH ARE CUANHAMA WHO NOT ONLY ANTI-WHITE RACISTS BUT CONTEMPTUOUS OF OTHER BLACKS AND SEEM INCLINED TOWARDS JOINING FELLOW-TRIBESMEN IN AN INDEPENDENT NAMIBIA. 70 TO 80 PERCENT OF THE WHITES FAVOR UNITA, PROBABLY INCLUDING HITES IN SECRET

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NORTHERN COFFEE AREA WHO TACTICALLY APPEAR SUPPORT FNLA SINCE AREA DOMINATED BY FNLA TROOPS BUT WHO WILL VOTE FOR UNITA IN SECRET BALLOT.

6. UNITA'S STRENGTH CAME NOT ONLY FROM ITS STRONG TRIBAL/REGIONAL BASE, BUT IN LARGE PART FROM SAVIMBI'S QUALITIES. VIEIRA DESCRIBED SAVIMBI AS A GENUINE AFRICAN/ANGOLAN NATIONALIST, AND AS A PRAGMATIST WITH A STRONG DEDICATION TO SOCIAL JUSTICE. HE IS DETERMINED TO GIVE ANGOLAN AFRICANS A MUCH GREATER SHARE OF THE NATIONAL WEALTH BUT NOT BY NATIONALIZATIONS (CABINDA GULF NEED HAVE NO FEAR OF HIM) NOR BY IMMEDIATELY REDISTRIBUTING WEALTH TO BE SQUANDERED ON DRINK OR HONDA MOTORBIKES. RATHER HE INTENDS THROUGH THE TAX SYSTEM TO PROVIDE THE STATE WITH THE WHEREWITHAL TO VASTLY INCREASE SOCIAL SERVICES, INCLUDING HOUSING, MEDICAL CARE, AGRICULTURAL EXTENSION. OWNERS OF URBAN LAND WILL BE CONFIRMED IN THEIR HOLDINGS, BUT RURAL LAND WILL BE CONFIRMED IN THEIR HOLDINGS, BUT RURAL LAND WILL BE SUBJECTED TO INTENSIVE EXAMINATION TO ENSURE THAT IT IS BEING FULLY UTILIZED. WHERE THAT IS NOT THE CASE, THE LAND WILL BE PROVIDED TO THOSE WHO CAN UTILIZE IT FULLY, BUT ON A USUFRUCT NOT PRIVATE PROPERTY BASIS. VIEIRA ASSERTED THAT SAVIMBI'S WELCOME TO WHITES TO REMAIN IN ANGOLA DERIVES NOT FROM ANY SUBORNATION BY THE WHITES BUT BECAUSE HE RECOGNIZES THE

COUNTRY'S PAUCITY OF HUMAN TALENT AND CONSEQUENT NEED TO KEEP AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE OF SUCH TALENT IN THE COUNTRY IN ORDER TO BUILD A BETTER ANGOLA. VIEIRA DESCRIBED A RALLY SAVIMBI CALLED IN OR NEAR SILVA PORTO, CLAIMED THAT IT WAS ATTENDED BY 600,000 PEOPLE, AND QUOTED THE BISHOP OF NOVA LISBOA AS SAYING HE HAD SEEN SUCH A MULTITUDE ONLY ONCE BEFORE: WHEN THE POPE VISITED FATIMA.

7. VIEIRA CLAIMED FNLA POSITION IN NORTH NOT AS STRONG AS THEIR MILITARY STRENGTH THERE WOULD IMPLY, SINCE MAJORITY OF BLACKS THERE PROBABLY PRO-MPLA. ADDITIONALLY, MANY OF FNLA TROOPS ARE FOLLOWERS OF RELIGIOUS LEADER SIMON TOCO AND WILL FOLLOW HIS ORDERS RATHER THAN THOSE OF FNLA LEADERS. WHILE TOCO HAS REMAINED POLITICALLY NEUTRAL, HE IS PACIFIST WHO HAS TALKED OF TELLING TOCOISTS TO BURN THEIR ARMS RATHER THAN ENTER INTO FACTIONAL FIGHT. ALSO HE HAS BEEN IN TOUCH WITH UNITA, HAS EXPRESSED ADMIRATION FOR AND SCHEDULED VISIT SAVIMBI AT TIME VIEIRA LEFT LUANDA.

8. VIEIRA STATED THAT ANTAGONISM BETWEEN FNLA AND MPLA WAS MOUNTING ALMOST DAILY. MPLA IS BRINGING ENORMOUS AMOUNTS OF ARMS
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INTO COUNTRY, AND, SINCE ITS FOLLOWING FALLS FAR SHORT OF ITS OUTSIDE SUPPORT, IS PUTTING WEAPONS INTO THE HANDS OF 14-YEAR-OLDS. MPLA HAS BEEN FLYING ARMS INTO ABANDONED DTA AIRSTRIP SOME 20 KILOMETERS FROM CELA WHENCE THEY ARE MOVED BY TRUCK TO LUANDA, VIRTUALLY ONLY AREA OF MPLA STRENGTH AND THAT DECLINING. MPLA TROOPS REPORTEDLY FORCIBLY PREVENTED FNLA LEADER VAAL NETO FROM APPROACHING AIRSTRIP RECENTLY. THIS ONLY ONE OF MANY FNLA/MPLA INCIDENTS WHICH, VIEIRA BELIEVES, WILL LEAD TO A CIVIL WAR BETWEEN THE TWO BY MAY. UNITA NEEDS TO BE FULLY ORGANIZED BY THEN.

9. ASKED IF MILITARILY EQUIPPING UNITA WOULD NOT ADD TO POTENTIAL FOR CIVIL WAR, VIEIRA REPLIED IN NEGATIVE. WHILE THERE WAS DEGREE OF COOPERATION BETWEEN UNITA AND FNLA IN OPPOSITION TO MPLA, THIS WOULD NOT EXTEND TO UNITA JOINING FNLA IN ANY ARMED CONFLICT. UNITA NEEDED MILITARY FORCE IN ORDER TO PREVENT USE OF TERRITORY UNDER ITS CONTROL BY EITHER OF THE OTHERS AND TO ENHANCE ITS IMAGE AS A VIABLE GOVERNING FORCE. WHILE UNITA IS OPPOSED TO COMMUNISM, AND THUS TO MPLA, IT IS POSSIBLY EVEN MORE APPREHENSIVE ABOUT ZAIRIAN IMPERIALISM WHICH MOBUTU WOULD SEEK TO PURSUE THROUGH HIS CONTROL OVER HOLDEN ROBERTO. VIEIRA HAS MET ROBERTO AND WAS FAVORABLY IMPRESSED BY HIM, PARTICULARLY HIS STATEMENT THAT HIS EXPERIENCE IN ZAIRE HAD TAUGHT HIM WHAT AN INDEPENDENT ANGOLA SHOULD AVOID. HOWEVER, VIEIRA HAS NO CONFIDENCE IN ROBERTO'S ABILITY TO DISENTANGLE HIMSELF FROM MOBUTU'S DOMINANCE SINCE HE DEPENDS ON HIM SO HEAVILY.

10. VIEIRA SAID THAT UNITA AT PRESENT ENJOYS SUPPORT IN AFRICA FROM ZAMBIA'S KUANDA, KENYA'S KENYATTA, HOUPHOUET-BOIGNY IN IVORY COAST, AND SENGHOR IN SENEGAL. INDEED, SAVIMBI WAS NOW OR WOULD SHORTLY BE VISITING ABIDJAN AND SENEGAL AND MIGHT PROCEED FROM THERE TO EUROPE. THEY HAD THOUGHT THAT BONGO IN GABON WAS ALSO

FAVORABLE TO THEM BUT NOW HAD SOME DOUBT. NOT ONLY DID AN AIRCRAFT BONGO HAD PROMISED TO SEND TO LUSO TO FETCH SAVIMBI FOR A VISIT NEVER MATERIALIZE, BUT ALSO UNITA HAD BEEN INFORMED IN EARLY MARCH THAT BONGO HAD ARRANGED FOR MEETING IN LIBREVILLE BETWEEN SOUTH AFRICAN PRIMIN VORSTER AND HOLDEN ROBERTO. UNITA WAS ALSO DUBIOUS BECAUSE OF GABON'S APPARENT SUPPORT FOR FLEC IN CABINDA. NEITHER FLEC SEPARATISM NOR ABSORPTION OF CABINDA BY GABON OR ZAIRE WAS ACCEPTABLE TO UNITA. UNITA'S OWN PROGRAM FOR CABINDA CALLED FOR A MAXIMUM OF LOCAL AUTONOMY FOR CABINDA WITHIN AN ANGOLAN FEDERATION. UNITA'S POSITION TOWARD SOUTH AFRICA WAS UNALTERABLE
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OPPOSITION TO APARTHEID AND SUPPORT FOR BLACK NATIONALISTS THERE AND IN NAMIBIA. WHILE SAVIMBI WILL ALLOW SWAPO TO CROSS ANGOLAN TERRITORY, HE WOULD NOT PERMIT THEM TO MAINTAIN BASES IN ANGOLA.

BEGIN XGDS1

11. ASKED WHY HE HAD GONE TO SUCH LENGTHS TO DELIVER HIS MESSAGE TO THE USG IN OTTAWA RATHER THAN SIMPLY CONTACTING THE U.S.M CONSUL GENERAL IN LUANDA, VIEIRA SAID THAT, ASIDE FROM HIS LONG-STANDING FRIENDSHIP WITH POST, HE KNEW THAT HIS MOVEMENTS IN LUANDA WERE CLOSELY MONITORED AND HIS TELEPHONE TAPPED AND HE FELT THAT THE EXTREME DELICACY OF THE MESSAGE HE HAD TO CONVEY DICTATED EXTRA-ORDINARY MEASURES TO ENSURE THA THE CONTACT BE MADE WITH THE MAXIMUM OF DISCRETION. POL COUNSELOR URGED HIM TO FOLLOW UP WITH AMCONGEN LUANDA AND SUGGESTED THAT VIEIRA'S ROLE AS LEGAL COUNSEL TO ANGOLAN EXPORTERS OF COFFEE TO THE U.S. PROVIDED A TOTALLY LEGITIMATE COVER FOR ANY MEETINGS WITH KILLORAN. ASKED IF CONGEN LOCAL EMPLOYEE DIAS COULD BE USED AS GO-BETWEEN, SINCE DIAS WELL-KNOWN TO UNITA SUPPORT (FNU) MARQUES IN LUANDA FIRM AUTO AVENIDA, POL COUNSELOR SUGGESTED THAT THE FEWER PEOPLE INVOLVED THE BETTER. VIEIRA AGREED PURSUE MATTER DIRECTLY WITH CONSUL GENERAL WITH WHOM HE HAS ALREADY BEEN IN TOUCH ON OTHER MATTERS.

12. POL COUNSELOR CONCLUDED MEETINGS BY ADVISING VIEIRA THAT HE COULD PROMISE HIM NOTHING BEYOND THE SUBMISSION TO WASHINGTON OF A FULL REPORT ON THEIR CONVERSATIONS. HE NOTED THAT THE MOMENT WAS NOT PARTICULARLY PROPITIOUS FOR THE TYPE OF U.S. INTERVENTION HE DESIRED, GIVEN THE PUBLIC ATTENTION AND CRITICISM THAT HAD BEEN GENERATED BY SIMILAR ACTIVITIES IN CHILE. HE OBSERVED THAT A SUDDEN ACQUISITION OF WEALTH BY UNITA WOULD BE LIKELY TO RAISE SUSPICIONS AND LEAD TO REVELATION OF THE SOURCE OF FUNDS. VIEIRA THOUGHT THIS DANGER MINIMAL, BOTH BECAUSE OTHER PARTIES SO OBVIOUSLY AFFLUENT AND BECAUSE IT KNOWN THAT UNITA HAD BEEN RECEIVING PRIVATE PORTUGUESE SUPPORT AND THAT WOULD BE SEEN AS THE SOURCE FOR ANY FURTHER SUPPORT. VIEIRA LEFT SOMEWHAT DOWNCAST, APPREHENSIVE LEST ANY U.S. AID TO UNITA MIGHT BECOME A SUBJECT FOR U.S. CONGRESSIONAL REVELATIONS, BUT LESS APPREHENSIVE ABOUT SUCH EVENTUAL REVELATIONS THAN ABOUT ANGOLA'S FUTURE IF UNITA UNABLE TO SECURE U.S. SUPPORT. HE WAS SCHEDULED RETURN LUANDA MARCH 23 AND HOPES FOR SOME USG RESPONSE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, SPECIFICALLY BEFORE OPTION

ON AIRCRAFT EXPIRES APRIL 13. END XGDS1

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